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Abstract 
Taxing sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) has been proposed as a means to improve U.S. diet 
and health and generate revenue to address obesity-related issues.   A related concern is that 
children’s intake of SSBs, a third that of milk consumption in the late 1970s, now equals milk 
consumption.  Displacing milk by SSBs may shortchange the buildup of bone mass, increasing 
the risk of fractures and osteoporosis in later life. Accordingly, we examine the effects that a 20-
percent SSB tax and a 20-percent milk price subsidy would have on the diet and health of 
American children.  We estimated US beverage demand systems and used the estimated demand 
elasticities to examine the impacts of the hypothetical SSB tax and milk subsidy.  Our results 
suggest that a 20-percent tax-induced increase in soda price alone would reduce calorie intakes 
by 40 calories a day among children, lowering the obesity rate from 16.1 percent to 13.4 percent 
and the overweight rate from 32 percent to 26.9 percent.  When a 20-percent price subsidy for 
milk is bundled with the SSB tax, children would on average decrease their calorie intake (21 
calories a day) and increase their calcium intake, but the overweight and obesity rates would 
actually increase by around 2 percent. The seemingly contradiction between the two averages, 
lower calories and higher obesity, is due to the fact that the majority of children (90 percent) 
remain unchanged in their weight classification under the price interventions but on average 
reduce their calorie intake. Six percent of children increase their calorie intake and gain enough 
weight to cross the overweight threshold, whereas four percent of children decrease their calorie 
intake to improve from being overweight to healthy weight.  Therefore, when averaging the 
effects of the price interventions, we found a decrease in calorie intake and higher overweight 
and obesity rates.  
 
 
Keywords: Sugar-sweetened beverages (SSB), soda tax, milk subsidy, beverage demand, and 
obesity 
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   3
1.   Introduction 
 
Rising obesity prevalence is a major health and economic concern in the United States.  Today, 
two-thirds of adults are overweight, and half of them are obese.  Likewise, about one-third of 
children and adolescents are either overweight or obese (Flegal et al., 2010; Ogden et al., 2010).  
Obesity is a costly health condition.  A quantitative review of the literature suggests that the 
medical cost associated with overweight and obesity in the U.S. totaled $114 billion in 2008 
(Tsai et al., 2010). 
 
As researchers look for causes of obesity and interventional strategies to tackle the enormous 
health problem, the association between rising obesity and consuming sugar-sweetened 
beverages (SSB) has attracted considerable attention.  Between 1976-80 and 2003-06, obesity 
prevalence rose from 5 to 12.4 percent among children aged 2 to 5; from 6.5 to 17 percent for 
children 6 to 11 years old; and from 5 to 17.6 percent for those aged 12 to 19 (figure 1).  
Meanwhile, over the same period, children’s daily consumption of regular soft drinks has 
reached equal levels of milk in 203-6, up from a third of milk consumption in the later 1970s 
(figure 2).  Displacement of milk by SSBs is a health concern because milk is the primary source 
of calcium in children’s diets.  Low calcium intake among children and adolescents may increase 
the risk of bone fractures as well as the risk of osteoporosis in older age by contributing to low 
peak bone mass.  According to the National Osteoporosis Foundation (2010), osteoporosis-
related fractures were responsible for an estimated $19 billion in costs (in terms of human 
suffering and health care) in 2005. 
  
In 2009, the severity of childhood obesity prompted the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to 
recommend taxing SSB to curtail its consumption (IOM, 2009).  Such a strategy has been 
proposed as a means of reducing the intake of SSBs, improving diet and health, and generating 
revenue that governments can use for addressing obesity (Brownell and Frieden, 2009; Jacobson 
and Brownell, 2000; Powell and Chaloupka, 2009).  The White House Task Force on Childhood 
Obesity (2010) has recommended conducting research to analyze the effect of taxing less 
healthy, energy-dense foods (such as soft drinks, candy, snack foods, and fast foods). 
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In this study, we estimate a beverage demand system using national household purchase data, 
specifically focusing on SSB and milk by fat content.  We then apply the demand elasticities and 
hypothetical price interventions to individual consumption data reported in national food 
consumption surveys to estimate dietary and health effects of taxing SSBs and subsidizing milk 
consumption.  We examine how adjustments in beverage consumption result in changes in 
calorie intake.  Using a calorie-intake to body-weight relationship, we calculate changes in 
children’s body weight by two income classes and the resulting outcomes on overweight and 
obesity prevalence.  In the following section we review previous research on beverage demands.  
We identify the research needs for improving demand elasticity estimates in order to analyze the 
effects of price interventions.  We then briefly present our approach followed by a description of 
the data.  A demand system is specified and the results are presented in the subsequent section.  
A detailed discussion on dietary, health, and economic impacts ensues. 
 
2.   Review of Beverage Demand Literature 
 
A recent comprehensive review of research on food demands revealed that the own-price 
elasticity for soft drinks has been reported to range from -0.8 to -1.0 (Andreyeva et al., 2009).  
This elasticity range has been used to predict consumers’ responses to taxing soft drinks.  There 
are deficiencies in the reported elasticities for such an evaluation.  First, when a particular 
beverage is taxed, consumers will respond by reallocating their beverage expenditure among all 
relevant beverages.  Lacking estimates of cross-price elasticities among beverages has led 
researchers to rely on the own-price elasticity and assume away cross-price effects (Brownell et 
al., 2009; Chaloupka et al., 2009).  This is a major limitation for evaluating the impact of a SSB 
tax on obesity because some juices and milk are more energy dense by volume than regular soft 
drinks (USDA/ARS, 2009).  Schoreter et al. (2008) utilized the own- and cross-price elasticities 
for regular and diet soft drinks, but no other beverages (such as juice, milk, or bottled water) 
were considered.  
 
Secondly, in order to reduce energy intake, and hence obesity, there is a need to distinguish 
between SSBs from their low-calorie counterparts.  There are studies that differentiate regular 
and diet soft drinks (Pittman, 2004; Dhar et al., 2003), but to our knowledge there has been no   5
attempt to separate sugar-sweetened fruit drinks, sports drinks, and energy drinks from their low-
calorie counterparts.   
 
In this study, we specify a demand system to addresses the above limitations in the SSB demand 
literature as well as enable us to evaluate the effect of subsidizing milk consumption.  Because 
the calorie content in milk varies by its fat content, we disaggregate milk consumption into three 
categories—whole, low-fat, and skim milk.  
 
3.   Analytical Approach and Data 
 
In this study, we estimate the effect of taxing SSBs and subsidizing milk on beverage 
consumption, calorie intake, and body weight among children ages 2 to 19.  Our approach 
involves the estimation of beverage demand using national household purchase data.  We then 
apply the demand elasticities and a hypothetical SSB tax rate and a hypothetical milk price 
subsidy to nationally representative surveys of individual beverage consumption to estimate 
adjustments in calorie intake from beverages and resulting body-weight changes.  The use of 
nationally representative data allows us to calculate the changes in overweight and obesity 
prevalence under hypothetical price interventions. Two beverage demand systems stratified by 
household income are estimated to improve elasticity estimates and to examine whether the 
effect of price interventions differ by income.   
 
3.1.   Data Sources 
This study uses two datasets to evaluate dietary and health impacts of levying a tax on SSBs and 
providing a subsidy on milk.  Data from Nielsen’s Homescan panel are used to estimate beverage 
demand systems for two income classes (Nielsen, 2007).  The demand price elasticities and 
hypothetical tax and subsidy are applied to individual food intake data from the 2003-6 National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) conducted by the CDC (CDC/NCHS, 
2009) to estimate changes in beverage consumption.  Energy and calcium contents in foods 
developed by USDA and recorded in the NHANES are used to convert beverage consumption to 
calorie and calcium intakes.  Using the measured body weight and height in NHANES, we   6
estimate the change in the prevalence of overweight and obesity from implementing price 
interventions.  The two datasets are briefly discussed below.    
 
3.1.1.  Nielsen Homescan Panel 
According to Nielsen, the Homescan panel consists of a national sample of U.S. households that 
provide food purchase information for at-home consumption.  Each household either scans the 
Uniform Product Code (UPC) for packaged foods or a designated code provided by Nielsen for 
random-weight (unpackaged) products for all their purchases from grocery stores or other retail 
outlets.  The data include quantity, expenditures, product characteristics, and promotional 
information as well as household income and demographic information.  On average, 22,750 
households participated in the Homescan panel between 1998 and 2007.  We aggregated 
household purchase data recorded during 1998 and 2007 into 120 monthly observations.   
 
Beverages are grouped into eight categories—sugar-sweetened beverages, diet (low-calorie) 
beverages, three types of milk, 100-percent fruit and vegetable juices, coffee/tea, and bottled 
water (see table 1 for definitions). Beverages in powdered or frozen concentrate form are 
converted into ready-to-drink equivalent weight.  The price was imputed as a unit value by 
dividing total expenditure (promotional and sale discounts incorporated) by the total quantity 
purchased.  Homescan panelists report household income in a specific range.  We use the 
midpoint of the income range and the household size to express household income as a percent 
of the Federal poverty threshold.  A 185 percent of the poverty threshold is used to classify 
households into high and low income.  The 185 percent of poverty threshold is the income 
eligibility cutoff for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and 
Children administrated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA/FNS, 2009).  Sample 
means and standard errors of the variables in the demand system are reported in table 2.  Note 
that low-income households allocated a higher proportion of their beverage budgets to SSB and 
whole milk than high-income households; while high-income households allocated a higher 
share of their beverage budget to diet drinks than low-income households.   7
 
3.1.2.  National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) 
The NHANES sample is nationally representative of non-institutionalized persons 
residing in the U.S. Respondents report their 24-hour dietary intakes for two non-consecutive 
days.  Respondent’s body weight and height are measured as part of a comprehensive medical 
examination.  Social, demographic, and income data are also collected.  Nutritional contents of 
the food reported in NHANES are developed by USDA allowing us to aggregate beverage 
consumption into eight categories, matching the specification from the Homescan data.  We use 
2003-6 NHANES data in this study.  Each year, NHANES surveys up to 5,000 individuals of all 
ages.  Excluding those with missing information on food intakes, body weight and height, 
income, children younger than 2 (lacks the growth curve for body weight classification) 7,291 
children ages 2 to 19 are included in this study.   
 
 
4.   Demand Model Specification and Results 
 
4.1.  Almost Ideal Demand System 
This study focuses on beverage consumption, and therefore, beverages are assumed to be weakly 
separable from all other goods. The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS, Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980) is used for our empirical estimation of a beverage demand system, as shown 
in equation (1) 
(1)  wi = αi* + ∑i γij lnpj + βi ln(m/P*) + ei  i = 1, … , n, 
where wi is the beverage expenditure share for beverage i; pj is the price for beverage j; m is the 
total expenditure for all beverages; and ei is the disturbance term.  P* is a price index defined by  
lnP* = α0* + ∑ αi* lnpi + 1/2 ∑i∑j γij* lnpi lnpj  
 
We hypothesized that monthly beverage consumption is influenced by temperature and it 
exhibits a time trend over the sample period.  The method developed by Alston et al (2001) was   8
used to incorporate temperature and time trend variables are incorporated into the constant terms 
in the AIDS model: 
αi* = αi + φ1i (temperature) + φ2i (time trend) and 
α0* = α0 + υ1i (temperature) + υ2i (time trend). 
Parameters to be estimated are αi, φ1i, φ2i, υ1i, υ2i,, γij, and βi.   Conditional expenditure (εi) 
and uncompensated price (εij) elasticity estimates at sample means can be calculated as: 
(2)  εi = 1 + βi/wi and 
(3)  εij = (γij - βi (wj - βjln (m/ P*))/wi – δij; 
where δij is the Kronnecker delta that is unity if i = j and zero otherwise. 
 
The iterative seemingly-unrelated-regression technique was used to estimate the AIDS model 
with homogeneity and symmetry conditions imposed. The data for the AIDS model (1) add up 
by construction.  The estimates were corrected for the first-order autocorrelation (Berndt and 
Savin, 1975).  For brevity, the parameter estimates are not reported (but available upon request) 
and the demand elasticities are reported in tables 3 and 4.   
 
4.2.  Results of Beverage Demands 
All own-price elasticities for both low- and high-income populations are found to be negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% probability level, except for skim milk for the low-income 
population.  For low-income households, diet (low-calorie) drinks, skim milk,  whole milk, and 
bottled water are found to be own-price inelastic, with own price elasticities ranging from -0.65 
for whole milk to -0.72 for bottled water.  Demands for SSBs, low-fat milk, juices, and 
coffee/tea are found to be about own-price unitary elastic, with own-price elasticities ranging 
from -0.84 for low-fat milk to -1.01 for juices.  Of the 56 cross-price elasticities for low income, 
19 of them are statistically different from zero at least at the 5% probability level, and 6 (13) of 
them are positive (negative) indicating substitution (complement) relationships.  The expenditure 
elasticities suggest that as the total beverage budget changes, a proportionally larger expenditure 
change would be expected for SSBs and diet drinks.  A slightly less than proportional change 
would be expected for skim and low-fat milk and juices. 
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It is interesting to see that high-income households are found to be more responsive to price than 
low-income households for some beverages.  For example, the demand for SSBs among high-
income households is found to be own-price elastic with a mean value of -1.30, indicating that 
these households are about 30 percent more responsive to the changes in SSB prices than low-
income households (-0.98).  However, the demand for diet drinks is found to be less price 
responsive for high-income than for low-income households (-0.47 vs. -0.69).  Likewise, the 
demands for low-fat milk, juices, and coffee/tea are also found to be less price responsive among 
high-income households, ranging from -0.34 for coffee/tea, -0.39 for low-fat milk, and to -0.93 
for juices.  The demands for skim milk, whole milk, and bottled water are found to be more 
responsive to price changes for high-income households than those for low-income households.  
Results also show that the demands for SSBs, diet drinks, bottled water, and coffee/tea are more 
responsive to changes in beverage expenditure than milk and juices for high-income households. 
Similar to low-income demands, a mixture of complements and substitutes are found among the 
eight beverages for high-income households.  Of the 56 cross-price elasticities, 23 were 
statistically different from zero at the 5% probability level. Results also show that diet drinks are 
more responsive to changes in beverage expenditures, while milk and juices are less responsive. 
 
5.   Assumptions for Evaluating Price Interventions 
 
There are several key assumptions we have to make in order to use the estimated demand 
elasticities to evaluate taxing SSBs and subsidizing milk. First, there are potential differences 
between the demand for beverages at home and away from home.  Previous research on beverage 
demand utilized different types of data and some investigated particulars facets of demand. For 
example, Kinnucan et al. (2001) and Zheng and Kaiser (2008) analyzed the USDA 
disappearance data (at-home and away-from-home combined) and estimated the effects of 
advertising on national beverage demand; Brown and Lee (2007) and Uri (1986) estimated 
beverage sub-demand systems using scanner data (for at-home consumption); Yen et al. (2004), 
Pofahl et al. (2005), and Pittman (2004) used household purchase data in their studies of 
beverage demand for at-home consumption.  In this study, we chose to use grocery purchases for 
at-home consumption to estimate beverage demand because of the research question about   10
whether the impacts of SSB tax and milk subsidy differ by income level.  The USDA food 
disappearance data are not suitable for addressing such a research focus. 
 
Estimating away-from-home demand for beverages is a challenge due to data limitations. 
Consumers often pay a single price for a meal, such as a combo meal at a fast food restaurant, 
which often includes a beverage.  Additionally, some restaurants offer free refills for soft drinks. 
Thus, quantity is ill-measured for the price.  At school cafeterias, milk is a required component 
in the meals offered through the National School Lunch Program. Milk is not priced individually 
and low-income children receive free lunches or pay a discount price, making it difficult to 
estimate milk demand at school. In this study, we assumed the same demand elasticities for at-
home and away-from-home consumption.  This assumption was made implicitly in the past 
studies estimating changes in beverage consumption from taxation (Andreyeva et al., 2009; 
Brownell et al., 2009; Chaloupka et al., 2009; Schroeter at al., 2008).  
 
A tax can be levied as an ad valorem excise tax based on price (e.g., sales tax) or as a specific 
excise tax based on quantity or volume.  Sales tax is usually paid by consumers making retail 
purchases, whereas a specific excise tax is usually paid by those who are further up in the 
distribution chain (i.e., manufacturers or distributors).  A sales tax is generally not displayed on 
the shelf in grocery stores or on a menu in restaurants, and thus consumers may not be aware of 
the tax burden (McLaughlin, 2009).  Further, beverage prices vary by brand, container size, and 
other factors creating an incentive for consumers to substitute lower priced beverages for the 
higher price ones, resulting in limited response to a sales tax (Brownell et al., 2009).  Individuals 
receiving food stamp benefits from the Federal Government are exempt from paying sales tax on 
beverages and hence not affected by such a policy.   
 
When a specific excise tax is levied, it will be shared by producers and consumers depending on 
the demand and supply conditions.  In the case that the taxed food has many (few) substitutes, 
manufacturers (consumers) will bear a larger share of the tax.  In the case of away-from-home 
beverage demand, the relatively low cost of the sugary input (syrup) may create a situation in 
which restaurants bear a part or even the full price of the tax.  In this study, we assumed that an 
excise tax is levied such that consumers face a 20-percent price increase on all SSBs.  A 20-  11
percent tax rate is chosen in part because it is close to the 18-percent tax recently proposed by the 
State of New York (New York Post, 2009).  We also assumed a 10-percent tax and the reduction 
in beverage consumption and calorie intake is about half of the reduction from a 20-percent tax.  
However, the reduction in overweight and obesity rates is non-linear of the tax rate and we will 
report, for brevity, the reduction in obesity for the 20-percent tax rate.   
  
We assume the milk subsidy is offered exclusively to milk consumed as a beverage, but not milk 
used in food processing before reaching retail market, such as cheese.  As mentioned earlier, 
milk is offered at a discount price or free at school cafeteria.  USDA reimburses schools for the 
cost associated with milk subsidy.  The same subsidy mechanism can theoretically be adopted 
for grocery purchases.  The subsidy is assumed to be reflected in the shelf price. 
   
A final assumption addresses the inevitable waste between the amount purchased and consumed.  
Our demand estimates were based on purchase data and impacts were measured using intake 
data.  Without an accurate estimate of waste, we assumed a constant proportion waste measure; 
so that a percentage change in purchase translates into the same percentage change in 
consumption. 
 
6.   Effects of Price Interventions 
 
6.1.   Average consumption and calories  
Using children’s first-day intake data in 2003-6 NHANES, we calculated the average per-capita 
daily consumption of the eight beverage categories and their associated calories contents (table 
4).  Beverage choices vary by income.  High-income children consumed SSBs, bottled water, 
and coffee/tea than low-income children.  High-income children also consumed more bottled 
water and coffee/tea than low-income individuals, while low-income children, on average, 
consumed more juices and whole milk.  As a result, low-income children consumed more 
calories from beverages than their high-income counterparts (411 vs. 394 calories a day). 
 
The estimated demand elasticities are applied to the individual beverage intake data in NHANES 
to simulate the potential effects of two hypothetical price interventions.  In the first simulation,   12
we consider the case in which a tax is levied on SSB such that consumers realize a 20-percent 
price increase.  In the second simulation, we apply a 20-percent price subsidy to all three milk 
beverages (skim, low-fat, and whole milk) on top of the SSB tax.  Changes in beverage 
consumption are converted to calorie and calcium intakes.  Then the resulting changes in body 
weight are derived using the commonly used relationship of 3,500 calories equal to one pound of 
body weight (Whitney et al., 2002).  Children body weight status is classified before and after 
the price interventions using the Child Growth Charts (CDC, 2009b). 
  
6.2.  Effects of taxing SSB 
The effects of a 20-percent price increase in SSBs on calorie intake and prevalence of 
overweight and obesity are summarized in table 5. On average, a reduction of 40 calories a day 
from the eight beverages is predicted for all children, with a reduction of 44 calories from SSB 
and a net increase of 4 calories from the remaining seven beverages.  With a larger intake from 
SSB and a higher own-price elasticity of demand for SSB, high-income children are predicted to 
reduce more calories from a SSB tax, compared to low-income children (50 calories vs. 36 from 
SSB alone; 45 calories vs. 33 from the eight beverages).  Our results suggest a mixed substitutes 
and complements among the eight beverages such that changes in calorie intake from the non-
SSBs cancel each other out, but still result in a measurable net change in total calories from the 
non-SSB beverages.  It is also important to point out that excluding all relevant beverages would 
result in an incomplete beverage demand system and hence bias the demand elasticity estimates.  
 
Under the assumption that 3,500 calories a year equates to one pound of body weight, we 
compared the overweight and obesity prevalence before and after taxing SSB.  The prevalence of 
childhood overweight (at the 85
th percentile or higher) was predicted to decline from 32 percent 
to 26.9 percent and the obesity prevalence (95
th percentile or higher) would decline from 16.1 
percent to 13.4 percent from a 20-percent tax.  The reductions in the prevalence of overweight 
and obesity are predicted to be larger for high-income children than for low-income children. 
 
6.3.   Effects of simultaneous SSB taxation and milk subsidy 
In the second price intervention scenario, we consider a hypothetical 20-percent price subsidy on 
milk purchase on top of the 20-percent price increase in SSBs.   This price intervention strategy   13
is predicted to decrease calorie intake and increase calcium intake (table 6).  Among all children, 
an average decrease of 21 calories and an increase of 40 milligrams of calcium in a day from all 
eight beverages are predicted.  The effects are predicted to be larger for high-income children 
than for low-income children.  
 
Surprisingly, despite the prediction of a decrease in calories on average for all children, the 
prevalence of overweight and obesity is predicted to rise (from 32 percent to 33.6 percent for 
overweight and from 16.1 percent to 18.1 percent for obesity among all children, not reported in 
table 6 but the overweight prevalence can be calculated from the figures represented in the table).  
This seemingly contradiction points out the fact that averages can be misleading.   
 
To demonstrate, children are classified into two categories--not overweight (called healthy 
weight for simplicity) and overweight (including obese)--before and after the price interventions 
(table 6).  Our results suggest that 90 percent of children do not change their body weight status 
as a result of the price interventions--62 percent of children are healthy weight and 28 percent of 
children are overweight before and after the price interventions.  Among these children, an 
average reduction of 26 calories and 16 calories a day is predicted for healthy weight and 
overweight, respectively.   
 
The price interventions would result in an average reduction of 93 calories a day and hence help 
four percent of children improve from overweight to healthy weight.  These four percent of 
children are predicted to gain the least amount in calcium intake, suggesting they shy away from 
milk in making beverage choices.  On the other hand, six percent of children are predicted to 
increase their calorie intake by an average of 52 calories a day and gain enough weight to change 
from healthy weight to overweight.  These children represent the only class who are predicted to 
increase their average calorie intake.  They also gain the largest amount in calcium intake, 
suggesting they increase milk consumption more than other children and hence increase their 
calorie intake.  As a result, on one hand the price interventions result in a decrease in average 
calorie intake among all children.  On the other hand, six percent of children change from 
healthy weight to overweight and four percent of children change from overweight to healthy 
weight, resulting in a net increase in the overweight and obesity prevalence.    14
 
7.  Discussion 
 
Rising prevalence of obesity correlates with several dietary patterns, such as increasing 
popularity in eating out and consumption of nutrition-poor but energy dense foods and 
beverages.  The use of economic incentives or disincentives to encourage healthy food choices, 
and hence reduce the incident of obesity, has received heightened support and attracted research 
efforts.   
  
It has been documented in the literature that food demands are generally own-price inelastic.  
Under inelastic demand, price manipulations alone will not induce large consumer responses.  
Researchers have examined the effects of taxing salty snacks and fat in dairy products, as well as 
the effects of subsidizing the consumption of fruits, vegetables, and milk (Kuchler et al., 2004; 
Chouinard et al., 2007; Lin et al., in press).  These three empirical studies support the economic 
theory that “[the] first fundamental theorem of taxation: a tax has little effect on inelastic goods” 
(McCloskey, 1982, p. 309).  The U.S. demand for food has been found to be price inelastic in 
general, but the price elasticity varies by food groups.  A recent literature review found the own-
price elasticity of demand for sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) to center around -0.8 to -1.0 
(Andreyeva et al., 2009).  However, a void exists in the beverage demand literature for the 
elasticities needed to address the budget allocation among competing beverages distinguished by 
calorie contents.  These elasticities are vital because recent taxation proposals have targeted 
sugar-sweetened beverages as a means to reduce obesity.     
 
Three studies have found limited effectiveness of SSB taxes, as currently levied, on body weight 
reduction (Powell et al., 2009; Fletcher et al., 2009; Schroeter et al., 2008).  However, some have 
pointed to the evidence of large favorable responses to the experiments that cut the price of 
healthy snacks and raise the price of unhealthy snacks at the school cafeterias (Jeffrey et al., 
1994; French et al., 2001).  It should be noted that the variety of foods at school cafeterias is 
generally restricted.  Further, school-age children have limited resources and may have unique 
utility function, making the cafeteria setting quite distinct from retail food markets in which a tax 
or a subsidy will be implemented.   15
 
In this study, we estimated a demand system for eight beverage categories for the needed 
elasticities to investigate the impacts of taxing SSBs on caloric intakes.  Because of the 
displacement of milk by SSBs and low intake of calcium could be a costly dietary deficiency, we 
also examined a simultaneous SSB tax and milk subsidy.  We utilized recent household purchase 
data from a national sample to estimate price responsiveness for low- and high-income 
households.  We found the own-price elasticity of SSBs for low-income households (-0.98) to 
fall in the range reported by Andreyeva et al. (2009).  However, the own-price elasticity for high-
income households (-1.30) was found to be more responsive to price changes.  The demands for 
skim, low-fat, and whole milk are found to be own-price inelastic for both high- and low-income 
households.  These elasticity estimates and a hypothetical 20-percent tax and subsidy were used 
to estimate changes in beverage consumption and associated calorie and calcium intakes for low- 
and high-income children in the U.S. using the food intake data collected by the National Health 
and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES).  The changes in calorie intakes resulting from a 
tax on SSBs and a subsidy on milk were used to estimate the reduction in the prevalence of 
overweight and obesity among children by income.   
 
In Healthy People 2010, the Federal Government set the goal to reduce child overweight and 
obesity rates from 11 percent to 5 percent (USDHHS, 2009).  The obesity rate has risen sharply 
since setting these goals.  In the present study, we found a 20-percent SSB tax (or a 0.4 cent per 
ounce based on the 1998-2007 national average prices of SSB) would reduce the obesity rate 
from 16 percent to 13.2 percent for children.  When a 20-percent price subsidy on milk 
consumption is added to the SSB tax, our results suggest that the childhood obesity rate would 
actually increase by 2 percent to 18 percent.  Therefore, our results suggest that taxing sugar-
sweetened beverages could have a measurable contribution to the goal of reducing obesity 
incident in the U.S. but a milk subsidy would encounter a tradeoff between forgone reductions in 
calorie intake and increase in calcium intake.    
 
Because many individuals, children and adults, are just a few pounds over or shy from the 
overweight and obese thresholds.  A small change in calorie intake and hence body weight will 
potentially change these individuals’ body weight classification.  Therefore, a discrete yes-or-no   16
weight classification may not accurately reflect the effect of intervention programs on obesity 
prevalence.  Future research is needed to examine the implication of using alternative prevalence 
measures, such as the one adjusted by the distance from the overweight and obesity thresholds 
(Jolliffe, 2004).  Another future research need involves the biological relationship of 3,500 
calories for one pound of body weight.  This relationship plays a crucial role in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the intervention programs for obesity prevention and reduction.       As suggested 
by the recent medical literature, the 3,500 calories for one pound of body weight could be an 
understatement of the amount of calorie reduction for weight loss (Swinburn et al., 2009).  
Medical research aiming at improving the robustness of the predictive model for the calorie and 
weight relationship is needed to help evaluating the effectiveness of obesity intervention 
programs.   17
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Table 1. Beverage categories and definitions.
Beverage Category    Types of beverages included 
Sugar-sweetened beverages (SSB)    Soda, fruit drinks, sports drinks, powdered mixes with 
added sugars 
Diet (low-calorie) beverages    Low- or no-calorie versions of the above SSB category 
Skim milk    Milk with less than 0.5g fat per cup 
Low-fat milk    Milk with less than 4.7g of fat per cup, includes 0.5 – 2% 
Whole milk    Milk with 8g of fat per cup 
Juices    All fruit and vegetable juices containing 100% juice 
Coffee/tea    Liquid coffee and teas, excludes dry beans and leaves 
Bottled water    Bottled water, excludes tap water 
Note: Milk is as defined by Food and Drug Administration, per 240 ml (1 cup), 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps1609/www.fda.gov/fdac/features/1998/198_milk.html 
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Table 2. Variable definitions and summary statistics, 1998-2007.
   Low-income    High-income 
Variable  Definition  Mean  St. Dev.    Mean  St. Dev. 
p1  Nominal price for SSB, $/gal  2.53  0.15  2.66  0.19 
p2  Nominal price for diet, $/gal  1.68  0.21  2.12  0.16 
p3  Nominal price for skim milk, $/gal  2.79  0.27  2.80  0.26 
p4  Nominal price for low-fat milk, $/gal  2.72  0.29  2.80  0.29 
p5  Nominal price for whole milk, $/gal  2.94  0.31  3.02  0.31 
p6  Nominal price for juice, $/gal  4.23  0.42  4.40  0.44 
p7  Nominal price for coffee/tea, $/gal  3.72  0.54  4.12  0.35 
p8  Nominal price for bottled water, $/gal  1.28  0.19  1.43  0.15 
w1  Beverage budget share for SSB  0.39  0.04  0.32  0.03 
w2  Beverage budget share for diet drinks  0.13  0.02  0.17  0.01 
w3  Beverage budget share for skim milk  0.04  0.01  0.06  0.01 
w4  Beverage budget share for low-fat milk  0.14  0.01  0.14  0.01 
w5  Beverage budget share for whole milk  0.09  0.01  0.05  0.00 
w6  Beverage budget share for juice  0.14  0.01  0.17  0.01 
w7  Beverage budget share for coffee/tea  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.01 
w8  Beverage budget share for bottled water  0.05  0.02  0.06  0.03 
φ1  Average U.S. monthly temperature   54.37  14.93  54.37  14.93 
Notes: Temperature is measured in Fahrenheit (NOAA, 2009). Means for all budget shares are 
significantly different at least at the 5 percent level using t tests for independent samples.   23
 
Table 3. Low-income population beverage demand elasticities in the U.S., 1998-2007. 
           Expenditure 
  Uncompensated Price Elasticities  Elasticities 
Beverage  εi1  εi2  εi3  εi4  εi5  εi6  εi7  εi8  εi 






*** -0.022 -0.034  1.023
*** 
  (0.082) (0.036) (0.023)  (0.041) (0.030) (0.045) (0.015) (0.023)  (0.0190 




*** -0.014 0.032 -0.013  1.024
*** 
  (0.104) (0.093) (0.036)  (0.063) (0.052) (0.069) (0.025) (0.039)  (0.021) 
Skim milk  -0.583
*** 0.085  -0.367 0.417 -0.023 -0.395    -0.031 -0.146  1.042
*** 
  (0.236) (0.128) (0.320)  (0.354) (0.308) (0.246) (0.081) (0.109)  (0.048) 
Low fat milk  -0.250
** 0.185
*** 0.115  -0.820
*** 0.097 -0.214
** -0.035  -0.032  0.955
*** 
  (0.115) (0.059) (0.095)  (0.188) (0.142) (0.101) (0.034) (0.047)  (0.037) 
Whole milk  0.242
* -0.459
*** -0.007 0.146 -0.631
*** -0.328
** 0.061  -0.014  0.990
*** 
  (0.129) (0.077) (0.128)  (0.221) (0.244) (0.136) (0.043) (0.062)  (0.021) 
Juices  0.473






  (0.127) (0.067) (0.067)  (0.103) (0.089) (0.130) (0.033) (0.049)  (0.016) 
Coffee/tea  -0.408 0.268  -0.057  -0.256 0.323 0.099  -0.802
*** 0.020 0.813
*** 
  (0.326) (0.188) (0.169)  (0.269) (0.215) (0.253) (0.148) (0.138)  (0.150) 









* indicate a level of significance of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Highlighted numbers indicate uncompensated own-price elasticities; all other uncompensated elasticities 
are cross-price estimates. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Nielsen Homescan data, 1998-2007.  24
 
Table 3. High-income population beverage demand elasticities in the U.S., 1998-2007. 
           Expenditure 
  Uncompensated Price Elasticities  Elasticities 
Beverage  εi1  εi2  εi3  εi4  εi5  εi6  εi7  εi8  εi 








  (0.096) (0.059) (0.021) (0.035)  (0.021) (0.049) (0.023) (0.039)  (0.045) 
Diet drinks  -0.591
***  -0.464
*** -0.024 -0.045  -0.058  0.024 -0.015 -0.101  1.274
*** 
  (0.112) (0.125) (0.033) (0.052)  (0.036) (0.076) (0.035) (0.063)  (0.052) 







  (0.107) (0.092) (0.170) (0.160)  (0.127) (0.086) (0.033) (0.057)  (0.050) 
Low fat milk  0.227






  (0.081) (0.064) (0.072) (0.107)  (0.073) (0.058) (0.024) (0.041)  (0.043) 
Whole milk  -0.054 -0.114 0.564
*** -0.383
** -0.804
*** -0.135 -0.020  0.129
* 0.817
*** 









  (0.093) (0.077) (0.031) (0.047)  (0.033) (0.084) (0.028) (0.048)  (0.048) 




  (0.278) (0.227) (0.079)
  (0.125) (0.083)  (0.181)  (0.128)  (0.159)  (0.143) 
Bottled water  1.005







  (0.192) (0.164) (0.054)





* indicate a level of significance of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Highlighted numbers indicate uncompensated own-price elasticities; all other uncompensated elasticities 
are cross-price estimates. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Nielsen Homescan data, 1998-2007. 
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Income   
  Sugary drinks  480  508 
  Diet drinks  28  40 
  Skim milk  15  42 
  Low-fat milk  123  171 
  Whole milk  126  61 
  Fruit juice  135  107 
  Tea/Coffee  70  75 
  Bottled water  72  119 
Total 1070  1123 
    
Average calories 
  Sugary drinks  189  195 
  Diet drinks  1  1 
  Skim milk  6  14 
  Low-fat milk  64  85 
  Whole milk  79  38 
  Fruit juice  63  50 
  Tea/Coffee  11  10 
  Bottled water  0  0 
Total 411  394 
    
Sample size  4080  3211 
Source: 2003-06 NHANES.  
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Table 5.  Effects of a 20% SSB tax on beverage calories and body weight status  








Change in calories (kcal/day):       
 All  beverages  -33.1  -44.7  -40.0 
 Sugary  drinks  -35.8  -50.3  -44.4 
      
Overweight prevalence before tax (%)  34.2  30.5  32.0 
Overweight prevalence after tax (%)  29.9  24.8  26.9 
Obesity prevalence before tax (%)  17.7  14.9  16.1 
Obesity prevalence after tax (%)  15.4  12.0  13.4 
 
 
Table 6.  Effects of a 20% SSB tax and a 20% milk subsidy on nutrient intakes  
and body weight status among children by income 
  
Body weight status          
Before  After  Percent of  Changes in  Changes in 
Price intervention  population  calories  calcium 
%  kcal per day  mg per day 
 
Healthy Æ Healthy  62%  -26  35 
Healthy Æ Overweight 6%  52  105 
Overweight Æ Healthy  4%  -93  9 
Overweight Æ overweight  28%  -16  42 
 
 All  children  100%  -21  40 
   High income  59%  -28  41 
      Low income  41%  -10  38  
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Source: Sex-and age-specific BMI ≥ 95
th percentile based on Centers for Disease Control 
























Source: Authors’ calculation of 1977-78, NFCS (Nationwide Food Consumption Survey), 
USDA; 1989-91 and 1994-98 CSFII (Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals), 
USDA; 1999-2002 and 2003-06 NHANES. 
 
 
 